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Abstract 
This paper reviews cases of successful price and wage adjustment, which are often regarded as 
constituting best practice, in Australia, Latvia and the German new states and contrasts them 
with the Greek experience under the Troika programmes. Latvia stands out as having had the 
quickest adjustment in wages. By contrast, before the crisis, Greek wages appeared to have 
been largely insensitive to labour market conditions but this changed with the programme. We 
find that the reaction of wages to unemployment in Greece under the programme was similar 
to that observed in Germany and Portugal (a case that has attracted less attention). A priori, it 
is likely that the change in wage behaviour in Greece was due to the labour market reforms 
imposed under the programme. But this cannot be proven beyond doubt. 
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Greece and the Troika –  
Lessons from international best practice cases 
of successful price (and wage) adjustment 
Ansgar Belke and Daniel Gros 
CEPS Working Document No. 2017/05, May 2017 
1. Methodology 
In this paper we present three international best practice (or those considered as benchmarks) 
cases of successful price and wage adjustment. In this context we critically evaluate the reforms 
undertaken within the Greek Adjustment Programme (see, for instance, Alcidi et al., 2014).  
Among the benchmark practice cases there will be Australia with its flexible exchange rate 
(Wood, 2013), Latvia with its exchange rate peg (Alcidi and Gros, 2013, Gros et al. 2014, Sippola, 
2011), and the East German “ Laender” after reunification and entering into a currency union 
with Western Germany (Wolf, 2011). 
The labour market is a key place were the adjustment takes place in a context of fixed exchange 
rates, no matter whether in the form of a currency board or a monetary union. Given that under 
this assumption external (currency) devaluation cannot act as safety valve to regain 
competitiveness and reduce external imbalances, the economy is forced into internal 
devaluation. This implies that prices must adjust and wages are a key price. Wage adjustment 
is key to allow the economy reach both internal and external balance. The immediate reaction 
after a sudden stop to capital inflows is of course that domestic demand falls. In the short run 
this is the only way to eliminate a current account deficit since it takes time to increase exports. 
A fall in wages will actually accelerate the fall in GDP in the short run. But the fall in wages 
stimulates net exports, allowing the economy to grow without incurring again large current 
account deficits (Belke and Gros, 2017). Without a fall in wages domestic has to remain 
depressed, and unemployment would remain higher. We therefore propose to analyse cases 
of significant wage/price adjustments, which could serve as a benchmark for Greece.1 
                                                     
 The authors are grateful to Matteo Migheli, Miguel Lebre de Freitas, Thomas Moutos, Werner Smolny as well as 
Francisco José Veiga for valuable comments and Matthias Busse for excellent research support. 
1 We would like to point out that a (relative) wage adjustment speeds up the adjustment towards the tradable 
goods, but it might have distributional implications and that the claim that if wages do not adjust (downwards) the 
economy contracts may thus be qualified. Since the income measure of GDP is defined as “compensation of 
employees plus gross operating surplus plus gross mixed incomes plus taxes less subsidies on both production and 
imports” (European Commission et al. 2009; p. 333), ceteris paribus a downward adjustment of wages 
corresponds by definition to a reduction in GDP. In principle, a reduction in wages can bring about an increase in 
GDP only if (a) on the expenditure side net exports increases enough (i.e., there is a substitution of foreign for 
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Austrialia provides an extreme example, with a formal wages and price policy, accompanied by 
strong competition policies, and legal authority to police the adjustment and to impose 
substantial fines where the basic rules are not followed. This was the package adopted by the 
Australian government in 1982 to deal with excessive real wage cost levels, inflation and high 
unemployment – under flexible exchange rates. Some argue that the policy was overall 
successful: real wage costs subsequently fell by 12 per cent, inflation fell back and full 
employment was restored (see, for instance, Wood, 2013). 
Such a policy of extensive controls seems no longer feasible today. European countries on fixed 
exchange rates thus had to rely on a so-called austerity-led internal devaluation strategy. This 
was the case for Greece, Portugal, Latvia and other programme countries. We thus propose to 
look at Portugal and Latvia as real life comparators. Another useful benchmark is the case of 
Eastern Germany, because it shows how the adjustment could take place within one country, 
which one can consider as the extreme case of a monetary union. 
Latvia, which maintained a tight peg to the euro and thus was also forced to adjust without any 
devaluation provides a particularly important comparison because the initial optimism that the 
Greek programme should succeed was based on the, perceived, success in this case. The 
macroeconomic adjustment programmes for Latvia was actually much stricter than that for 
Greece, but the adjustment was quicker and followed by a stronger rebound. At the trough of 
Latvia’s recession, the programme was also off-track and failure seemed imminent, but it 
turned out that the sharper-than-planned adjustment cleared the way for a solid recovery 
(Alcidi and Gros, 2013, Biggs and Mayer, 2014, Gros et al., 2014).2  
Portugal, which came shortly after Greece provides another benchmark as the country seemed 
to face similar problems as Greece in terms of low competitiveness (for details see Alcidi et al., 
2014).  
As another, best practice case we refer to the new states following German reunification. 
Whereas this case is informative in suggesting that significant internal devaluations in larger, 
relatively closed economies are feasible, it of course does not speak in favour of the desirability 
or effectiveness of internal devaluations in the Eurozone crisis economies. Such an assessment 
would require close attention to the specific circumstances, notably the cross-linkages between 
the external cost competitiveness and the fiscal challenge, as well as to the likelihood that a 
                                                     
domestic demand: domestic demand is unlikely to increase because of the cut in domestic income) and/or (b) on 
the income side the gross operating surplus increases (i.e., there is a shift in the functional distribution of income). 
For such a shift in the functional distribution of income to occur, unemployment must rise. In any event, the data 
show that this process takes some time. Therefore, while it may be true that “if wage adjustment does not take 
place, the economy contracts”, if wage adjustment takes place the economy will contract either, but only in the 
short run. See, for instance, Belke and Gros (2017). 
2 See Kang and Shambaugh (2014) for a comparison of the progress towards external adjustment in the Euro Area 
periphery (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) with that of the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania). 
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cost competitiveness gain would result in a significant export response – which does not seem 
to be the case for Greece a priori (Paqué, 2009, and Wolf, 2011). 
There exists a substantial literature (see Belke and Gros, 2017) on what constitutes a ‘success’ 
of IMF programs.3 The current policy debate puts emphasis on the trade-offs between 
“external” and “internal” devaluation. Obstfeld (1997) claims that the former can be successful 
even in the presence of real wage resistance. In this context Belke and Gros (2017) and Alcidi 
et al. (2014) find it interesting to compare what happens to real wages under “external” and 
“internal” devaluation. The EU provides many examples of both adjustment methods. But our 
concern is not judge whether IMF programs are well designed. We take a simpler, policy 
orientated view: we regard a programme as a ‘success’ if the country concerns obtains market 
access within the time frame considered of the programme itself (and if there is no need for 
another pro-gram within a short period of time). The case of Greece stands out in this respect 
(Belke, 2017). But market access should of course not constitute the only criterion of success. 
But market access usually comes only if the country grows again. Greece was not able to exit 
its programme because the country did not manage to embark on a sustainable growth path 
(Belke and Gros, 2017). 
The next section looks at wage developments at the macroeconomic level. 
2. Wage developments at the macroeconomic level 
The relationship between slack in the labour market and wage growth is usually called the 
Phillips curve.4 The basic idea is simply that an excess supply of labour (measured by the 
unemployment rate) should lead to lower wage growth. 
This mechanism seems to have operated in Greece as nominal wages have fallen while 
unemployment rose above 20% as shown in Figure 1 below. However, a closer look at the data 
shows that prior to 2009 there was no clear relationship between unemployment and wage 
growth in Greece. The data up to 2008 (in the red oval) shows no clear relationship between 
these two variables. 
                                                     
3 For instance, Ul Haque and Khan (1998) broadly agree with the assumption that IMF plans have been applied 
mostly with success. However, they are IMF economists. Bird (2001) challenges their view, by considering a wider 
set of indicators, including the rate of recidivism and the completion of programs. Besides the obvious conflicts of 
interest (never ask the barber for a haircut, nor the IMF for a program), the issue of completion, considered by 
Bird, seems especially relevant in the Greek case and deserves some attention. 
4 For the renewed interest in the Phillips curve see, for instance, Stan Fisher’s speech on the transmission of 
exchange rate changes to output and inflation (Fisher, 2015). 
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Figure 1. Phillips curve Greece  
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO. 
This absence of a Philips curve type relationship pre crisis sets Greece apart from other 
programme countries with a low per capita income level.  
Figure 2 below shows that in Portugal wages had already begun to decelerate as unemployment 
increased well before the crisis broke. The increase in unemployment and the further fall wage 
growth during the acute phase of the crisis seems to have represented a continuation of a 
cyclical movement, which had already started beforehand.  
Figure 2. Phillips curve Portugal  
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO. 
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The same can be said of Latvia, where wages had been growing at an extreme pace (an increase 
of close to 40% at the peak of the boom in 2007), but decelerated sharply during the bust, 
which wage growth falling to minus 10% in 2009 (while unemployment increased by 12 
percentage points (from about 6 to 18%).  
Figure 3. Phillips curve Latvia 
  
Source: European Commission, AMECO 
3. International best practice cases of successful price and wage adjustment - a 
review 
After having discussed briefly the three programme countries with fixed exchange rates we 
now turn to a more in depth discussion of two more complex cases - one under flexible 
exchange rates with an inflation problem (Australia) and another one within a monetary union 
with unified labour market institutions (the new Laender in Germany). 
3.1 Australia 
The “Prices and Incomes Accord” 
In 1982 the Australian government adopted an incomes policy5, consisting of formal wages and 
prices policies, called the “Prices and Incomes Accord” to deal with excessive real wage cost 
levels, inflation and high unemployment (apparently also core problems in Greece at the start 
of the crisis), allegedly without reducing the living standards of Australians – under flexible 
                                                     
5 Incomes policies have in the past often been resorted to during wartime or in times of serious distortions of the 
international payments system. They were much less successful in other periods where evidence was mixed, at 
best. See, for instance, Enev and Koford (2000) on the effect of income policies on inflation in Bulgaria and Poland 
and the period 1990 to 1993, and, even on a more general level, Gaspar et al. (2014), p. 55. 
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nominal exchange rates. Notably, this represents a different restriction than that faced by 
Greece today, i.e. “irrevocably” fixed nominal exchange rates within a currency union. The 
Accord represented an agreement met in 1983 between trade unions and the Australian 
Labour Party government (Prime Minister Bob Hawke and Treasurer and later Prime Minister 
Paul Keating) which, however, did not include the employers. All participants were obliged to 
relate their decisions to the overall economic situation and outlook (Romanis Braun, 1986, p. 
3f.). Unions agreed to restrict wage demands, and the government in turn pledged action to 
minimise price rises (potentially useful also in the Greek case).6  
The rationale for resorting to this measure was that the relationship between wage inflation 
and unemployment had deteriorated considerably as shown in the chart below. For example, 
by 1974 wages were increasing by close to 30% p.a. although unemployment stayed at 2%, 
about the same level as the mid-1960s, when wages were increasing only by about 5%. Wage 
inflation then decelerated considerably to about 5% by 1983, but at that time unemployment 
had increased to 10%. The trade-off had thus considerably worsened. The Accord can be seen 
as an attempt to shift the curve back towards the origin (i.e. to reach lower (wage) inflation 
with lower unemployment).  
Figure 4. Phillips curve Australia  
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO 
The Accord, which was renegotiated several times, can be characterised as a strategy of a 
formal wages and prices policy composed of temporary, tailor-made wages and prices policies. 
Among its formal elements were a general wage rule, a general price rule, strong competition 
                                                     
6 The government was also to act on the social wage. At its broadest this concept included increased spending on 
education as well as welfare. See also Gregory (1986). 
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policies, and legal authority to police the adjustment and to impose substantial fines where the 
basic rules are not followed.  
However, two years after the instalment of the Accord the issue arose whether wages should 
be fully indexed for price increases flowing from the at that time large devaluation of the 
Australian dollar. The government has responded by arguing for partial indexation and was thus 
“placing the Accord in jeopardy” (Gregory, 1986, p. S53). 
What is more, many of the key elements of the Accord were weakened over time, as unions 
sought a shift from centralised wage fixation to enterprise bargaining in 1993.7 The Accord 
ceased to play a major role after the recession of 1989–92, and was finally abandoned after the 
Labor government was defeated in 1996. The election of John Howard in 1996 dramatically 
changed the position of the Australian government on the ideological scale. The Liberal 
government was opposed to any wage fixing. This government's core beliefs were that the free 
market should determine wages, whilst the government should focus on tight monetary policy 
and avoid budget deficit. This was the beginning of a period of increased hostility between the 
government and the union movement in Australia and marked the end of the Accord period. 
Assessment 
Some proponents argue that the policy was overall successful: real wage costs subsequently 
fell by 12 per cent, inflation fell back and (close to) full employment was restored during the 
later period of the Accord (see, for instance, Wood, 2013). Some economists also agree that a 
credible incomes policies would help prevent inflation (Romanis Braun, 1986). However, the 
official Australian unemployment rate did fall under the early Accord, reaching a minimum of 
6% in 1990, but rapidly increased again between 1990 and 1992.8 
Anne Romanis Braun (1986), a former staff member of the IMF's Research Department, deals 
with the nature of wage determination and the problem of securing an economically 
appropriate development of money incomes in an open economy over the medium term. 
According to her, the need for incomes policies arises, when there is strong evidence that a 
tolerable degree of price stability cannot be achieved by reducing the level of demand without 
incurring an unacceptable high cost in terms of loss of output, unemployment and growth (as 
claimed by many also for the case of Greece). Hence, incomes policies have, at the second 
height of their popularity in the middle-1980s, often been presented as a means of improving 
the trade-off between unemployment and price stability (Romanis Braun, 1986, p. 3, Gregory, 
1986). 
                                                     
7 Enterprise bargaining implies wage and working conditions being negotiated at the level of the individual 
organizations. 
8 See http://www.budget.gov.au/2004-05/bp1/html/bst4-01.htm. For the early incomes policies period see 
Gregory (1986). 
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However, incomes policies may have other effects. By arbitrarily interfering with price signals, 
they provide an additional bar to achieving economic efficiency, potentially leading to 
shortages and declines in the quality of goods on the market, while requiring large government 
bureaucracies for their enforcement. This is what happened in the United States during the 
early 1970s (Yergin and Stanislaw, 1997). When the price of a good is artificially lowered, this 
creates less supply and more demand for the product and thus leads to shortages.9  
Some economists argue that incomes policies (interpreted as a strict anti-inflationary device 
and not, as it is often the case, as an instrument to lessen the inequality of income distribution, 
see Romanis Braun, 1986, p. 4) are less expensive and more efficient way of fighting inflation 
than recessions. Yet others argue that wage controls and recessions can be complementary 
solutions for relatively mild inflation. 
By construction, incomes policies have the best chance of being credible and effective for those 
sectors of the economy dominated by monopolies or oligopolies, particularly nationalised 
industries, with a significant sector of workers organized in labor unions. These institutions 
enable collective negotiation and monitoring of the wage and price agreements. This condition 
does not seem to be fulfilled in the case of Greece: most employment is in very small 
enterprises where wages and working conditions are negotiated at hoc. Wage bargaining and 
labour unions dominate only the public sector and public utilities (like power generation, etc.).  
Even in cases where incomes policies have been relatively successful in the immediate short 
term, the moment they are abolished, large spikes in wages and prices tend to follow (Gaspar 
et al., 2014, p. 55).  
Other economists argue that inflation is essentially a monetary phenomenon, and the only way 
to deal with it is by controlling the money supply, either directly or by means of interest rates. 
They argue that price inflation is only a symptom of previous monetary inflation caused by 
central bank money creation. This view holds that, in the absence of a totally planned economy, 
the incomes policy can never work, because the excess money in the economy will greatly 
distort areas which the incomes policy does not cover (Belke and Polleit, 2010). 
3.2 German new states 
As an extreme, case we refer to wage and cost developments in the new Laender following 
German reunification. This is a special case because it concerns diverging trends in two regions 
of one country and thus within the same system of labour relations. The intra-German case is 
also interesting because, as shown below, it was mainly about productivity, rather than nominal 
wages. 
                                                     
9 Here, we raise the issue that by arbitrarily interfering with price signals income policies provide an additional bar 
to achieving economic efficiency. But it should be mentioned that in the case of labor markets the same may 
happen because of structural reforms, as Daveri and Jona-Lasinio (2005) and Gordon and Dew-Becker (2008) 
among others have pointed out. We owe this point to an anonymous referee. 
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We look at eastern Germany and see what happens in a currency union between two non-
harmonised economies with very different productivity profiles. In eastern Germany’s case, 
there have been massive subsidies to mask these problems. In the case of Greece, as in Spain 
and Ireland, this will not be the story.10 
Is a purely internal devaluation in a larger, less open economy operating in a monetary and 
customs union feasible? The new states following German reunification have been moving from 
substantially higher unit labour cost relative to the old states in the early nineties to 
substantially lower costs today. Case studies suggests that the achievement of a significant 
internal devaluation, while slow, may not be as unlikely as widely thought, and points to the 
relative productivity channel as an important potential contributor to adjustment (Wolf, 2011). 
The experience of the new states following German reunification suggests that substantial 
cumulative competitiveness gains are possible but require significant time. The case further 
points to relative productivity gains - and hence to structural reforms - as an important aspect 
of the adjustment process. Let us now turn more closely towards the real exchange rate 
adjustment following German reunification in the new German “Laender”. 
In 1990, the economic system of the Federal Republic was transferred to the new Laender, 
which in the process also became members of the European Community, and thus the customs 
union.11 While the adoption of the DM and the conversion rate were the subject of intensive 
public debate, concerns about the advisability of immediate monetary unification gained no 
political traction under Chancellor Kohl; the DM became legal tender in the summer of 1990 
and the wages of East German workers which previously had been in the Mark of the GDR were 
then paid out one to one in DM. On top of this wages in the new Laender were increased quickly 
towards the West German level. 
These large wage increases were in excess of productivity growth in the immediate years 
following reunification and thus raised unit labour costs above the level in the old states, 
themselves in absolute terms near the highest globally. Alongside steep declines in 
manufacturing output and employment, exports fell sharply in the initial post reunification 
years. Though poor export performance reflected multiple factors in addition to deteriorating 
cost competitiveness - including the reduction in the capital stock and the collapse of traditional 
markets - the challenge of restoring cost competitiveness (relative to the old states and to other 
transition economies) emerged as one prominent issue from the mid-nineties onward; 
matched by concerns about deteriorating cost competitiveness relative to trading partners in 
the old states (Wolf, 2011).  
In a sense the new German Laender faced even more significant challenges than Greece since 
the entire economic system had to change in a few years and former markets in Eastern Europe 
disappeared. These differences limit the comparability with Greece. But the case of German 
                                                     
10 See, for instance, https://www.creditwritedowns.com/2010/06/questions-internal-devaluation-work-
europe.html. 
11 For more details see Paqué (2009). 
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reunification does provide insight into the narrower question whether significant 
competitiveness problems as measured by high relative unit labour costs can be addressed 
within the context of a monetary and customs union in a larger, less open economy, the specific 
focus of this section (Wolf, 2011).  
The difference in unit labour costs between East and West which had arisen in the early years 
of German unification was later gradually erased, but not by lower wages. Movements in 
relative productivity were the key. In the manufacturing sector accounting for the largest share 
of exports, relative worker compensation in the new states rose from substantially below half 
of the level in the old states to the low seventy percent range by the mid-1990s 
(Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 2010). The same period witnessed a 
dramatic contraction in output and an even more dramatic decline in employment. The 
resulting productivity increase however fell short of the wage increase, finding its reflection in 
relative unit labour costs initially rising to more than fifty percent above the level in the old 
states (and dramatically above levels in other transition economies), before gradually declining 
to a premium in the low twenty percent range by mid-decade (Wolf, 2011).  
Against a backdrop of sharply rising unemployment and heterogeneous economic prospects 
across and within sectors and regions, wage-setting arrangements in the new states gradually 
decentralized, with firm-specific agreements playing a larger role compared to the old states. 
The decentralization was accompanied by a stabilization of relative nominal wages in the low 
seventy percent range by the mid-nineties. Subsequent changes in relative unit labour cost 
were thus driven by relative productivity growth, which so far have been absent in Greece. 
Slower but steady convergence translated into a gradual decline in relative unit labour costs, 
with parity being reached at the turn of the century. In the subsequent decade, the two trends 
- no relative wage growth coupled with steady relative productivity growth - have persisted in 
the manufacturing sector, accumulatively reducing relative unit labour costs close to 15% 
below the level in the old states (Wolf, 2011). This is just the opposite to the Greek performance 
up to now.  
The gains in cost competitiveness of the new German “Laender” were accompanied by a 
rebound of growth in the manufacturing sector and even faster export growth, taking the 
export ratio in manufacturing to one third (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Technologie, 
2010). But even today the export ratio of manufacturing in the new Laender remains below 
that of the old Laender in the West. Empirical studies on the export ratio and the determinants 
of export activity in the new states see Zeddies (2009) and Schultz (2010) find that differences 
in price competitiveness no longer play an important role. Structural factors, such as 
differences in firms size (firms are generally smaller in the East) and the lower share of 
manufacturing can explain most of the existing differences. 
We have concentrated so far on the intra-German adjustment. However, it is widely considered 
that Germany entered EMU with excessively high wages (at the time Germany had a current 
account deficit and a higher unemployment rate than the euro area average). It seems that 
Phillips curve did work in Germany as shown in the chart below which shows (pan) German 
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wage increases and the unemployment rate. There is a rather tight relationship with only one 
outlier (2009) when the fear of a long lasting recession led to agreements with stagnant wages, 
but the recession proved to be short lived (for Germany) and unemployment did not increase, 
partially because of the specific provisions for temporary short-term work. 
Figure 5. Phillips curve Germany as a whole 
  
Source: European Commission, AMECO. 
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prices plus productivity confirm essentially this finding (Quaas and Klein, 2010, p. 14). After a 
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Germany before 1991 since around 1994/95, given that the institutional system of West 
Germany was adopted fully in former East Germany (Belke, 1997, Belke and Hebler, 2002, 
Belke, 2003). “Augmented” Phillips curves are functioning well and prove to be rather stable in 
an econometric sense.  
In the following, Phillips curve estimates for the German “New Laender” and West Germany 
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shrinking since 2005. It seems as if the slope of the Phillips curve for the German ‘New Laender’ 
is significantly lower.12 
Figure 6. Phillips curve Germany (“Alte Laender”) 
 
Figure 7. Phillips curve Germany (“Neue Laender”) 
 
Source: Bundesamt für Statistik (destatis databank) and Statistische Ämter (Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen der 
Laender) 
  
                                                     
12 However, one should be careful with any conclusions with respect to the relative steepness of the curves 
because the number of observations is rather low. Moreover, Eastern Germany finds itself at another position ON 
the Phillips curve, characterized by unemployment which is twice as high.  
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Lessons 
The case of the new German Laender suggests that adjustments of this magnitude - a 
cumulative forty point swing even after the initial rapid drop, taking place at a time when wage 
growth in the old states was itself constrained by concerns about a loss of cost competitiveness 
relative to trading partners - can be achieved within a larger, economies. 
But the required adjustment period will be substantial if the initial gap is sizable and cannot be 
compressed by an initial absolute wage adjustment. The experience with the new German 
“Laender” suggests an annual decrease in the two to three percent range as a rough benchmark 
for an extended gradual adjustment (Wolf, 2011).  
The third lesson has to do with the composition of the adjustment in the new Laender, with 
relative wages remaining stable after the initial adjustment period and subsequent gains in 
relative productivity providing the core adjustment channel, pointing to the importance of 
accompanying structural reforms promoting productivity growth in easing the adjustment 
burden on relative wages in countries such as Greece seeking to reverse cost competitiveness 
losses.  
In the following section we critically evaluate the reforms undertaken within the Greek 
Adjustment Programme vis-à-vis the reforms of the best practice countries based on estimated 
Phillips curves. 
4. Wage behaviour under the Greek Adjustment Programme vis-à-vis the best-
practice countries 
In order to capture the differences in the labour market adjustment process and thus in the 
costs of adjustment across the countries, we compare the very simple estimates of the Phillips 
curve for the countries shown above and calculate the implications of these differences for the 
needed wage adjustments (see also Alcidi and Gros, 2013, and Belke and Boeing, 2014, for 
comparisons). Based on these results, we then critically evaluate the reforms undertaken within 
the Greek adjustment programme which at first glance appear closer to the spirit of the Latvian 
reform package. 
Table 1 below shows two estimates of the slopes of the Philipps curves. The first column shows 
the estimated slope coefficient based on a logarithmic formulation (i.e. wage inflation as a 
function of the logarithm of the unemployment rate). This functional form was chosen because 
it is often argued that wages are rigid downwards, which implies that the Philips curve should 
become flatter at high unemployment rates. The second column shows the estimated slope 
based on a simply linear relationship. At first sight there are large differences between these 
two estimates, but in reality the two curves are very close to each other (see below exemplified 
by the Greek case).  
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Figure 8. Phillips curve Greece 
 
Source: European Commission, AMECO  
Moreover, and this is the key consideration, the relative ordering is very similar in both columns 
with Germany, Portugal and Greece showing similar values, but Latvia quite different. The 
justification for the logarithmic form was that the ‘second lower bound’ of decreases in nominal 
wages would make the Philips curve particularly flat at zero wage increases. However, this does 
not have been the case for any of the three countries considered here. In the case of Portugal, 
the reductions in nominal wages recorded in 2011 and 2012 were actually somewhat larger in 
absolute terms than one would have expected from the pre-crisis relationship. The same seems 
to have been the case in Latvia in 2009. We thus prefer the ‘normal’ linear form. 
Table 1. Examples of slopes of Philips curves within in the euro area versus Australia 
 Logarithmic Linear 
Latvia 30 2.4 
Portugal 4 0.42 
Greece 8 0.50 
Germany  3.2 0.43 
Australia  4.0 0.75 
Source: Own calculations.  
The amount of wage disinflation gained by each percentage point increase in unemployment 
(technically the slope of the Philips curve) does not appear to differ much between the three 
‘old’ Member states Greece, Portugal and Germany. The value for Greece is at 0.5 actually 
somewhat higher than those of these other two countries (0.42 and 0.43). In this table Latvia 
is the outlier as in this country wages react five times as much to unemployment as in Greece 
and six times more than in Germany or Portugal. 
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From a purely accounting point of view the difference between Latvia and Greece (or Portugal) 
means that in order to achieve the same gain in competitiveness unemployment in Latvia has 
to increase by only one fifth of the amount needed in Greece or Portugal. A concrete example 
can illustrate this in practical terms.  
It was widely assumed that wages needed to adjust by about 20-25% in Greece in order to bring 
competitiveness indicators back to the level when Greece joined the euro area. During the 
boom years, unemployment in Greece hovered around 10 and wages increased by about 4% 
per annum (see the cluster on the upper left hand side of chart 1). During the program, 
unemployment increased by about 16 percentage points (reaching about 26%). With a 
coefficient of 0.5 this implies that wage inflation should now be about 8 percentage points 
lower, i.e. wages should be declining by about 4% per annum. These values imply that 
unemployment would have to remain for a total of 5 to 6 years at the present level in order for 
the previous loss of competitiveness of 20-25% to be fully corrected13. However, if the Greek 
Phillips curve had the same slope as that of Latvia, i.e. if wages in Greece were as reactive to 
unemployment as in Latvia one year of unemployment at the present level would have been 
enough. This extremely high reactiveness of inflation to unemployment is thus one key reason 
why the adjustment was so much shorter in Latvia than in Greece (or in Portugal). 
As shown above the Phillips curve had been rather steep in Latvia already before the crisis. It is 
thus unlikely that this advantage of Latvia was the result of reforms undertaken under the 
programme in that country (which also had contained labour market measures). Moreover, 
Latvia is also an outlier in terms of another adjustment mechanism, namely labour mobility. 
Since the start of the crisis the population of Latvia fell by about 10%, against only 2% for 
Greece, or Portugal.14 
This relatively large rate of emigration around a deep crisis makes the Latvian Phillips curve 
even more of an anomaly. A high propensity to emigrate in the face of a recession should 
reduce domestic unemployment, as presumably mainly the unemployed will go abroad. Fewer 
unemployed should reduce the pressure on wages to fall.  
However, it is not clear whether one can ascribe the high rate of emigration in Latvia to the IMF 
program. First of all, the country had a high rate of emigration already before the financial crisis. 
Already in 2006/7, boom years for Latvia, the population was falling by almost 1% per annum. 
At the peak of the crisis, in 2009/10 the rate of emigration more than doubled, to 2.2%. 
Emigration thus did not start with the economic crisis, but it reacted strongly to it. Overall, given 
that emigration doubled during the crisis, it seems that about one half of the total loss of 
population over the last decade was due to the crisis.  
                                                     
13 Assuming the absence of wage increases in the rest of the euro area. 
14 This development points to a tension between political and economic issues. While the optimum currency area 
(OCA) literature considers labour mobility as contributing to adjustment, such a large-scale emigration might be 
politically difficult to accept. 
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But one has to keep in mind that neighbouring Lithuania, which did not have an IMF program, 
experienced very similar rates of emigration (with an even higher peak of 2.9% on an annual 
basis in 2010). It seems that all Baltic countries had a high degree of labour mobility, which 
presumably facilitated the adjustment to their extreme boom-bust cycles (Alcidi and Gros, 
2013, Alcidi et al., 2014). 
It was shown above that the negative relationship between unemployment and inflation 
started for Greece only with the programme years. This is, a priori, a strong sign that that labour 
market did function differently under the program. But it is difficult to ascribe this difference 
to structural reforms in the labour market given that with a recession of unprecedented depth 
and duration one would anyway expect a break with past patterns (path-dependence or 
hysteresis). Moreover, a close inspection of the data in figure 8 above shows that wages started 
to fall by almost 3% annually already in 2010, before any of the labour market programme 
measures had been implemented (and with unemployment not yet much higher than at the 
start of EMU). The speed of the fall in wages did not accelerate strongly after 2010 although 
most of the increase in unemployment came in subsequent years. It is possible that the start 
of the fall in (nominal) wages in 2010 was due to the indirect effect on the private sector of the 
reduction in public sector salaries and the reduction in minimum wages, which had also been 
part of the programme. 
5. Conclusions 
Adjustment programs under fixed exchange rate must rely on ‘internal devaluation’, i.e. a fall 
in domestic prices and wages. Has this mechanisms worked during the last financial crisis, which 
forced a number of European countries to accept an IMF program? We concentrate on the 
adjustment of wages and find that before the crisis wages in Greece seemed to have been 
largely insensitive to unemployment, but this changed with the crisis and the program. 
It is difficult to disentangle the impact of policy (the program) from other factors, namely that 
labour market participants behaved differently because they realized that the country faced a 
fundamentally different environment, not just a cyclical downturn. 
The fact that wages started to decline almost immediately after the crisis had started and 
already before any reforms had been implemented, provides some evidence that the impact 
of the labour market reforms undertaken (imposed?) under the programme were not the only 
reason for the change.  
We also observe that in Portugal wages and unemployment had been linked even before the 
crisis; and that the programme does not have changed this relationship significantly although 
the Portuguese programme also contained important labour market reforms. We find that 
there is little difference in the reactiveness of wages to unemployment between Greece, 
Portugal and even Germany. The real outlier is Latvia where wages react 5-6 times more to 
unemployment than in these countries. 
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At a more general level, recent explanations of the pre-crisis slowdown in productivity insist on 
another market distortion, the low level of the real rate of interest brought about by the euro 
(Gopinath et al., 2015, and Cette, Fernald and Mojon, 2016). Since productivity adjustments 
play a major role in this contribution when we refer to the experience of the New German 
Laender, it is fair to point out that also the onset of the euro in some cases provided wrong 
incentives. 
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